This paper investigates optimal central bank disclosure in an economy in which only a proportion of firms adjusts prices each period to reflect current information. Such information comprises a firmspecific signal of the current state of aggregate demand and, potentially (depending on the transparency regime) a public signal disseminated by the central bank. The economy has two sources of price dispersion: first, the heterogeneity of the private signals of firms whose prices always reflect current information, and second, the non-adjustment of prices by firms that fail to update their information from period-to-period. Monetary policy is conducted by the central bank to maximize expected welfare, with the study's focus on the optimal degree of transparency. A key finding is that, for plausible values of model parameters, full transparency cannot be optimal: whether zero or partial transparency is desirable then depends on the proportion of firms failing to update their information each period.
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Introduction
A major issue in monetary policy design is that of whether central banks should publicly reveal the information on which their policy decisions are based. As widely documented (see for example, Blinder et al., 2008; Dincer and Eichengreen, 2014) , modern central bank practice reflects, to a large degree, a belief that transparency is conducive to the attainment of the aims of policy. Nonetheless, theoretical support for the alleged efficacy of central bank disclosure is far from categorical.
A particular qualification to the case for transparency is identified in the literature concerned with the consequences of imperfect heterogeneous information regarding economic fundamentals in economies in which strategic complementarities are present. This literature, initiated by Morris and Shin's (2002) important contribution, has shown that in such an environment individual incentives to align actions with those of other agents may either undervalue or overstate the social benefits from coordination. The associated departure from efficiency which potentially arises in the context of dispersed information then gives rise to the possibility that improvements in private sector information will be detrimental to welfare.
In such an instance, any public communication from the central bank regarding its assessment of the prospective economic state can then be counter-productive.
Within the related literature, two critical factors have been identified as determining the welfare effects of central bank transparency. First, whether or not there is a divergence between what Angeletos and Pavan (2007a) define as 'the equilibrium degree of coordination' and 'the socially optimal degree of coordination'. Such a divergence underpins the potential, referred to above, for inefficiency in private sector responses to available information. The second consideration is then whether the central bank uses its own information, which is not directly observed by the private sector but which potentially might be made public, to undertake active monetary policy intervention. Optimal stabilization policy is able to ensure that the dispersed information of the private sector and the central bank's own information are together exploited efficiently: however, its ability to accomplish this depends crucially on the latter not being publicly disclosed.
1 These principles are 1 We note that central bank disclosure might be detrimental even in the absence of stabilization policy if the equilibrium degree of coordination exceeds the socially optimal degree of coordination: Morris and Shin's (2002) 'beauty contest' model provides an example of such an eventuality, though as argued by Svensson (2006) their 'anti-transparency' conclusion depends crucially on parameter values. On the other hand, in the presence of policy intervention, if such policy is not directed at maximizing a measure of social welfare which is 2 established in Lawler (2011, 2012a) in the context of abstract representations of an economy, and are reflected in the findings of Baeriswyl and Cornand's (2010) analysis of transparency using a micro-founded macroeconomic model.
The present paper examines the robustness of these principles to the presence of some private sector agents who do not base their economic choices on continuously updated information.
Specifically, applying the simple general equilibrium framework due to Woodford (2002 Woodford ( , 2003 and Adam (2007) , in which firms' pricing decisions are made in an uncertain macroeconomic environment, we assume only a subset of these firms to adjust their prices in response to contemporaneous signals regarding the current economic state. The remaining firms are then assumed to set prices at values which maximize the expected value of profits, conditional on information available in the previous period.
Firms which update their information in the current period observe a firm-specific private signal of the realized value of an aggregate demand shock. They may also, depending on the transparency regime, observe a public signal communicated by the central bank, and derived from the latter's own signal of the shock. For simplicity, the central bank is assumed to be the sole source of public information; 2 the degree of transparency is then represented by the information content of the signal transmitted by the central bank. In addition to potentially being communicated (possibly in a modified form) to the private sector, the central bank's own signal informs its setting of monetary policy.
The adopted approach to modelling price-setting behaviour can be rationalized in terms of the costs of information acquisition and processing of the type that underpin Mankiw and Reis's concept of 'sticky information', and which lead a fraction of firms not to update their information in any given period. The particular representation of this phenomenon followed in the present paper also characterizes the analyses of Baeriswyl and Cornand (2010) and Hahn (2014) . Both these contributions investigate the implications of informational heterogeneity for the welfare consequences of central bank transparency. However, the former paper ultimately focuses on the limiting case arising as the proportion of firms updating their information each period approaches unity. Consequently, it does not directly consistent with the payoff functions of individual agents then it will generally be associated with the possibility that greater transparency is welfare-improving: see, for example, Walsh (2007) . 2 The presence of further sources of public information would not affect the conclusions drawn from the analysis that follows, providing that the errors in any additional public signals contain components that are orthogonal to the errors in the central bank's signal.
examine the issue that represents the principal concern of this paper. Hahn's analysis, on the other hand, while considering a scenario in which a subset of firms does not update information each period, differs from the current investigation in assuming the central bank to set monetary policy in a discretionary manner, rather than according to a pre-defined rule.
The potential for multiple equilibria in a discretionary policy environment then takes the focus of Hahn's paper in a different direction (and to different conclusions) than that of the analysis that follows.
Significantly, the presence of firms which do not update their information prior to setting prices gives rise to a source of heterogeneity in information additional to that associated with the idiosyncratic private signals observed by firms which do update. In this respect, the present analysis is connected to that contained in James and Lawler (2012b) , which assumes differences in information quality across two groups of private sector agents in the setting of Morris and Shin's (2002) framework. 3 In the context of the current model, heterogeneity of information is reflected in dispersion of prices: such dispersion represents a source of welfare loss additional to that arising from aggregate output volatility. The latter, like price dispersion, is amplified by the presence of firms that do not set prices on the basis of current information.
The study's focus is on the following question: given that, conditional on the signal observed by the central bank, monetary policy is conducted optimally from the perspective of social welfare, how does the release of some or all of the central bank's information to the private sector impact on welfare outcomes? If all firms adjusted prices in response to current signals, social welfare would, in accordance with the analyses of Baeriswyl and Cornand (2010) and Lawler (2011, 2012a) , be strictly declining in the degree of transparency.
However, in the presence of firms whose prices do not incorporate current information, we find that there is no definitive answer to the question: indeed, it is possible for zero, full or some intermediate degree of transparency to be optimal. Nonetheless, reference to empirical evidence regarding the values of key parameters suggests that full transparency is likely to be dominated, in a welfare sense, by zero transparency. Whether or not the latter is to be preferred to partial transparency is shown to depend on the proportion of firms whose pricing decisions do not reflect current information.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the model structure.
Our main results are identified and discussed in Section 3, which determines the properties of the model's equilibrium and analyses the welfare effects of transparency. In Section 4, the implications of a corrective tax scheme, as originally considered by Pavan (2007b, 2009) , are briefly explored. Finally, Section 5 summarizes and presents the conclusions to be drawn from the study.
The model
The model that provides the vehicle for the analysis of this paper derives from the microfounded general equilibrium framework developed in the studies of Woodford (2002 Woodford ( , 2003 and Adam (2007) , and applied in the context of the transparency issue by Baeriswyl and Cornand (2010) , Hahn (2010), and Roca (2010) . 4 There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive price-setting firms, uniformly distributed over the unit interval with each employing a common production technology. The representative household's utility is defined over consumption, described by a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator over the varieties of differentiated goods, and leisure. The framework allows household welfare to be represented, as a second-order approximation, by the following: The relative importance of the two components of the right-hand-side of (1), is determined by the structural parameter  , whose value depends on the degree of risk aversion of the household as well as the elasticity of substitution, ( 1)   , between different varieties of good.
Firm i's optimal price,ˆi p , is found from consideration of its profit-maximization problem to be a linear function of its expectations of the price level and the output gap:
where the parameter  , which determines the responsiveness of ˆi p to the expected output gap, is related to  by  =  , and thus   .
Aggregate nominal demand, n, within the economy is determined by the setting of the central bank's policy instrument, g, and the realization of an aggregate demand shock,  , i.e. n (≡ p + y) = g + . In conducting the analysis, we assume realizations of the shock to be drawn, as in Morris and Shin (2002) , from a uniform prior over the real line. Although this appears a somewhat special case and, as will be discussed, has certain implications for the optimal conduct of monetary policy, all the principal results of this paper, as reported in Sections 3 and 4, can be shown to extend to the case of a normally distributed disturbance.
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The above expression for nominal income can be rearranged as:
allowing (2) to be expressed as:
Equation (2') makes clear the dependence of firm i's optimal price on the prices set by all other firms. We consider the case of (0,1)   , in which case prices are strategic 6 complements, i.e. there is a benefit (declining in  ) to the individual firm of aligning its own price with those of other firms.
The significance of a strategic complementarity in price setting derives from the presence in the model, discussed below, of dispersed private sector information. These aspects of the framework connect the current study to the literature initiated by Morris and Shin's (2002) identification of the potential dangers of public disclosure of information by policymakers.
Important in this context is Angeletos and Pavan's (2007a) distinction between the equilibrium degree of coordination and the socially optimal degree of coordination. The former identifies the equilibrium response of agents' actions to the expected aggregate value of such actions, while the latter indicates the socially efficient response. Should these coordination concepts diverge in value then, in the presence of information that is heterogeneous across agents, the private incentives to align actions do not appropriately reflect the social benefits of such alignment. Morris and Shin's (2002) important contribution employs a model in which the equilibrium degree of coordination exceeds the socially optimal degree of coordination. The key implication of this is that public information is accorded an inefficiently high weight relative to private information and provides the source of the conclusion that greater precision of public information might be damaging to welfare. The present framework, in contrast, is characterized by an equilibrium degree of coordination which lies below the socially optimal degree of coordination. 8 Reflecting this, the individual firm does not fully recognize the social benefit of aligning its own price with other firms' prices, with the consequence that price setting entails an excessive weight being placed on idiosyncratic private information.
If each firm's individual product price was continuously adjusted to its (ex ante) optimal value, ˆi p , conditional on current information, price (and output) dispersion would purely reflect the idiosyncratic information errors associated with heterogeneous firm-specific signals. However, we assume that a proportion (0,1)   of firms do not update their information each period: consequently, given the assumed stochastic properties of the shock, such firms leave prices unchanged at their previous period's value. 8 The equilibrium degree of coordination is 1   , while its socially optimal counterpart is 1   ,with the relationship between  and  implying 11     . Note that for  = 1 individual firms do not perceive any strategic complementarity, despite the social benefit of price alignment.
As indicated in the Introduction, this assumption can be rationalized by reference to the costs of acquiring and processing information. In the same way as in Mankiw and Reis (2002) , such costs mean that only a proportion of firms base their pricing decisions on current information. We note that, in assuming that state variable realizations are uncorrelated, the present model abstracts from the dynamic implications of sticky information that are central to Mankiw and Reis's contribution. This allows a clearer focus on the consequences of informational heterogeneity arising from the presence of non-updating firms. 9 In the present context, the non-adjustment of prices by firms that fail to revise their information provides a source of price dispersion further to that arising from heterogeneity of the information possessed by firms which do update, while also impacting on volatility of the output gap.
Firms are ordered such that those who fail to update their information prior to setting prices are distributed along the interval (0,  ), while those who employ current information to determine their optimal price lie in the interval [  ,1]. The common price of the goods produced by the former group is normalized for convenience, but without any loss of generality 10 , at zero. It follows that the price level is described by:
Using p to denote the average price of firms which adjust prices in response to current information, i.e. (1), can be written as:
9 In fact, the presence of autocorrelation would not, in itself, modify the main aspects of the analysis that follows in any significant way. Assume  to be determined according to
The first term on the right-hand side of (5) 
. In addition to this private signal, firm i also potentially has access to a public signal, whose source is the central bank. This public signal is then used in conjunction with the firm's private signal to form optimal estimates (conditional on the observed signals) of  , p, and g , which are then combined, as described by (2), to determine ˆi p .
Prior to both making any announcement and implementing monetary policy, the central bank observes its own noisy signal,  , of the aggregate demand shock, with  =    , where
Ei   . This signal is private to the central bank, in the sense that it cannot be observed directly by any firm. However, depending on the transparency regime, the central bank may choose to disclose its value, possibly in a modified form, to the private sector. Transparency is modelled in terms of how precisely the central bank reveals its own information to the private sector. The public signal,  , potentially introduces additional noise to the central bank's own signal before being communicated to the public. In particular, the 11 If the initial average price of updating firms is identical to that of the non-updating firms, then this expression can be written, as in Hahn (2014) 
) represents the inflation rate. Thus, price inflexibility (whatever its source) on the part of a sub-set of firms introduces a route through which inflation impacts on social welfare in contexts where complete price flexibility would imply inflation per se was welfare-neutral (see Woodford, 2003) . Note that substitution of the above expression into (1) gives rise to a welfare function which, apart from the term associated with information heterogeneity across the updating firms, is identical to that employed in numerous studies where the social loss function is not derived explicitly from an underlying micro-founded model. to form an expectation of  ,
 and  allows an updating firm to improve its estimate of the signal observed by the central bank,
 , compared to that arrived at using the public signal alone, with the optimal estimate of  , and the publicly announced value of the latter,  .
14 Hence, the setting of the monetary policy instrument is determined according to:
12 Notable examples include Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) and Svensson (2001, 2002 ). An alternative representation of transparency is in terms of Cornand and Heinemann's (2008) concept of the 'degree of publicity' which identifies the extent of transparency with the proportion of private sector agents to whom the central bank's signal is disclosed. Cornand and Heinemann's approach is applied in Walsh (2007) and in Lawler (2012a, 2012b) . 13 It is assumed that no firm observes the value of the central bank's policy instrument before setting its price. Thus we abstract from the potential signaling role, emphasized in Baeriswyl and Cornand's (2010) study, that policy might play. The analysis of James and Lawler (2012a) suggests that allowing for such a signaling role does not change the conclusions regarding optimal transparency compared to when such a role is absent. 14 The central bank is assumed not to observe any i p ( [ ,1] i   ) prior to choosing its setting of policy; while it has knowledge of the common price of non-updating firms' output our normalization means that its value does not appear explicitly in the policy rule as described by (6). We further note that if all firms used current information in setting prices, a policy response to  would be irrelevant, since the pricing responses of firms to the public signal would render welfare outcomes independent of this component of policy. Hence the optimal value of 2  would be indeterminate. However, with the prices of a subset of firms failing to incorporate current information, policy responses to the public signal invariably have an impact on welfare outcomes. 
Equilibrium and the Welfare Effects of Transparency
Equilibrium and optimal policy
We begin by identifying the equilibrium pricing decisions of those firms which set prices using current information, taking as given both the values of the rule parameters and the 'degree of transparency', as captured by  to be determined:
It follows that each updating firm sets its individual product price according to:
The corresponding expression for p then follows from Realized welfare can now be found using (7) and the implied expressions for p and p , in combination with equations (3) and (6), to substitute for the price dispersion and output gap terms in (1): (
In general, the distribution of welfare outcomes will reflect the stochastic properties of  and the signal error terms. From the assumed distribution of the state variable, it is evident that for arbitrary combinations of 1  and 2  the unconditional expectation of welfare will be undefined. However, if the policy rule parameters are restricted to sum to  1, in which case the central bank fully offsets its expectation of the aggregate demand shock, the direct influence of the shock on welfare is eliminated, as is evident from (10). Unconditional expected welfare is then obtained by integrating over the normally distributed disturbances  and  , and is clearly well defined.
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Imposing the constraint 12 1     on the policy rule and applying it to (10), allows the unconditional value of expected welfare to be taken and the optimal values of the two policy parameters to be found from the relevant first order conditions. Denoting these values by 1   and 2   , we find: 
The above expression provides the basis for the analysis of how central bank transparency, as measured by the quality of the public signal provided by the central bank, i.e. 
Limiting cases of transparency and expected welfare 3.2.1 The welfare implications of zero transparency
Under a regime of zero transparency, the public signal conveys no useful information to the private sector regarding the central bank's observation of 
17 Consequently, the prices of updating firms are, under zero transparency, unresponsive to observations of private signals and therefore remain perfectly aligned, both relative to each other and with respect to non-updating firms' prices. Thus, 17 This follows from the property ( | ) ( | )
14 there is no price dispersion and the loss in welfare identified by (13) arises purely from aggregate output fluctuations associated with central bank expectational errors. 
Expected welfare with full transparency
In this case, the central bank fully discloses the observed value of its own signal to the public, 
As for the case of zero transparency, central bank expectational errors, which lead to imperfect stabilization of the impact of the aggregate demand shock, are the proximate source of the welfare loss represented by (14). However, in the present case, additional forces come into play.
By combining the information content of their private signals with that conveyed by the public signal, updating firms are able to form a superior estimate of  compared to that based on the public signal alone. Hence, in this case, each firm adjusts its price in response to its own expectation of the central bank's policy error. This exploitation of the information present in private signals has a beneficial welfare consequence, since it leads to a reduction in aggregate output volatility relative to the zero disclosure case. 20 At the same time, however, price dispersion is introduced, both within the set of updating firms and between this group and the set of non-updating firms: of course, such dispersion is detrimental to welfare. 18 As noted previously, in the case of a normally distributed aggregate demand shock policy is designed to only partially offset expected shock realizations. As a consequence, updating firms are induced to respond to their private signals of  by adjusting prices. In this instance, the equilibrium under zero transparency is therefore characterised by a degree of price dispersion. 19 Note that, although taking the limit of (11a) and (11b) (1 ) (
This expression cannot be signed on a priori grounds and, thus, which of the two extreme instances of transparency delivers a superior welfare outcome is, in general, indeterminate. In developing our arguments, we adopt this reference point and take the maximum value of the relative precision of the two signals to be unity.
Applying this benchmark to the sufficient condition identified above for zero disclosure to be associated with welfare outcomes superior to those arising under full disclosure, the inequality becomes 2  . As previously noted, the case in which goods are strategic complements corresponds to (0, 1)   : with the upper limit of this range imposed, a new 21 Svensson (2006) Ball and Romer (1990) , in their study of real rigidities and monetary non-neutrality, refer to such evidence in applying a mark-up value of 0.15 to their model, a figure which is broadly consistent with the values reported in Oliveira Martins, Scarpetta and Pilat (1996) , and the recent study by De Loecker and Warzynski (2012).
22 Such a value implies an elasticity of substitution of 7.7, a magnitude which is comfortably in excess of that needed to ensure that zero disclosure is preferable to full disclosure. Indeed, observed mark-ups exceeding the implausibly large value of 0.5 would be necessary to imply a value of  less than 3. Thus, empirical evidence appears to be consistent with the notion that zero transparency gives rise to superior welfare outcomes compared to those resulting under full transparency.
The conclusion that for plausible values of key parameters zero transparency is associated with higher welfare than full transparency might appear, at first sight, surprising. This is particularly so since, as previously discussed, within a regime of zero transparency the information content of each updating firm's private signal is 'lost', in the sense that there is no price response to it and, consequently, attained welfare is identical to that which would arise if no firm updated its information set in the current period. The explanation for the finding lies in the feature which is at the centre of the related literature. That is, when both public and (heterogeneous) private signals are observed in an economy characterized by strategic complementarities, private sector actions based on that information are potentially inefficient from the viewpoint of social welfare. Lawler (2011, 2012a ) using abstract models which incorporate strategic complementarities and heterogeneous information show that, in the presence of stabilization policy, any (otherwise private) information released by the policymaker is detrimental to welfare. 23 Although this result is derived in the context of models which assume all private sector agents to base their 22 Oliveira Martins et al's (1996) paper covers 14 OECD countries over the period 1970-92, while De Loecker and Warzynski's (2012) recent study employs Slovenian data relating to the years 1994-2000. 23 James and Lawler (2011) incorporates stabilization policy into the Morris and Shin (2002) framework and models the degree of transparency in an identical way to that followed in the present paper, i.e. the precision of the public signal disclosed by the central bank. In contrast, James and Lawler (2012a) represents disclosure policy as in Cornand and Heinemann (2008) , with the central bank potentially revealing its own (unmodified) signal to only a subset of the private sector. Additionally, the payoff function applied in James and Lawler (2012a) is characterized by the property that, as in the present paper but in contrast to Morris and Shin (2002) , private sector agents undervalue the social benefits arising from coordination of actions.
decisions on current information, it clearly has relevance (albeit in a modified form) to the current setting.
To identify this inefficiency, we consider the pricing decisions of updating firms under full transparency. Each such firm's price response to the signals that it observes reflects its estimate of the central bank's expectational error,  , in respect of the aggregate demand shock. 24 However, this response is muted somewhat by the coordination motive associated with the strategic complementarity which characterizes the model. Any price adjustment by updating firm i based on the signals that it observes will inevitably give rise to a deviation from the common price of non-updating firms' output. Furthermore, with firm i's estimate of  derived, in part, from its own private signal, the idiosyncratic element inherent in this signal represents a source of departure from the average price set by other updating firms. In the presence of a coordination motive, these factors lead to a reduced sensitivity of price adjustments to firms' estimates of the central bank's expectational errors regarding  . Firm i's price under full disclosure of its signal by the central bank is given by: (18) with (13) The potential for partial transparency to be optimal does not arise in the analyses contained in Lawler (2011, 2012a) , in which all agents choose their actions based on currently available information, both private and public, and where the former, while dispersed, is homogeneous in quality. Rather, in both contributions, zero transparency unambiguously attains the welfare maximum in the presence of optimal policy. However, the possibility that an intermediate degree of transparency, in which the policymaker partially reveals its 27 We note that there is a discontinuity in the relationship between  is taken to be normally distributed.
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For any arbitrary degree of transparency, an updating firm's expectation of the central bank's forecast error is described by 2 2 2 2 James and Lawler (2012b) . The key feature of the framework developed therein is that the quality of private sector agents' private information, as represented by the precision of the idiosyncratic signals they observe, is heterogeneous. Heterogeneity of quality of information is clearly also present in the current model, though extended to public as well as private information, with the precision of nonupdating firms signals being, in effect, zero. Thus, it appears that differences in information precision across agents represent a factor associated with the potential for partial transparency to be optimal.
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A further aspect of the implications of heterogeneous information quality observed in James and Lawler (2012b) shared by the present analysis is that optimal stabilization policy, in combination with the optimal transparency regime, is unable to attain the 'first best': i.e. the welfare outcome associated with all agents reacting in a collectively efficient fashion to current information. This contrasts with the findings presented in Lawler (2011, 2012a) , but reflects the fact that, when information quality is non-homogeneous across agents, the policy rule cannot be tailored to induce all agents to choose their actions in a manner consistent with overall efficiency. This shortcoming of stabilization policy leads to the question of whether an alternative, or additional, form of policy intervention might be capable of improving welfare outcomes and we turn to consider this issue in the next section.
An Optimally-Designed Pigouvian Tax
A means of addressing the inefficiencies arising from dispersed information in economies in which strategic complementarities are present is identified by Pavan (2007b, 2009) . They show that an appropriately-designed tax regime can be used to manipulate the incentives which agents have to respond to information in such a way that, subject to the degree of information dispersion that characterizes the economy, the first best (i.e. socially efficient) outcome is attained. In this respect, such a tax represents an alternative to the direct 30 The representation of central bank disclosure policy in terms of the central bank's choice of the precision of the public signal as adopted in the analysis of this paper is important for the finding that, for plausible parameter values, partial transparency might dominate zero transparency. Assuming, instead, that the central bank potentially communicates its own (unmodified) signal only to a proper subset of firms, as in Cornand and Heinemann (2008) and James and Lawler (2012a, b) , the conditions 3 < θ and information', the aim of the present study has been to identify how this phenomenon might influence the welfare consequences of transparency.
The macroeconomic framework used to analyse this issue has the pricing decisions of individual firms at its centre. Within the model, even if all firms set prices on the basis of current information regarding aggregate demand shocks, as embodied in observations of both public and private signals, macroeconomic equilibrium would not correspond to the socially efficient outcome. This feature reflects the interaction between the strategic complementarity which characterizes the framework and heterogeneity of private information. The nature of the strategic complementarity is such that the incentives facing an individual firm do not adequately reflect the social benefits of price alignment. As a consequence, firms place too much weight on their private signals, giving rise to excessive price dispersion. The presence of firms whose prices do not incorporate current information on aggregate demand shock realizations then leads both to increased price dispersion and to greater output volatility.
Although monetary policy intervention is able to mitigate the associated welfare losses, stabilization is inevitably imperfect. Thus, the question is raised of whether public disclosure of the central bank's private information can bring the economy closer to the social optimum.
The foregoing analysis has demonstrated that, within the framework, there is no unequivocal answer to this question. If all prices responded to current information then, given optimallydesigned policy intervention, a regime of zero transparency would invariably maximize welfare, reflecting the principles exemplified in Lawler (2011, 2012a) . However, the presence of non-updating firms introduces the possibility that either full transparency or some degree of partial transparency might be optimal. In this regard, as noted in Section 3, the conclusions echo those arrived at in James and Lawler (2012b) , which shares the feature of the current model that the quality of information differs across groups of agents.
Nonetheless, for empirically plausible parameter values, full transparency is welfaredominated by zero transparency. With stabilization policy conducted optimally, a regime of zero transparency eliminates price dispersion completely. Although this comes at the expense of greater aggregate output volatility compared to the case of full transparency, providing reasonable parameter restrictions hold then the welfare costs associated with this feature will be outweighed by the benefits arising from the absence of price dispersion. However, zero transparency implies that the information content of updating firms' private signals is left completely unexploited. Reflecting this, partial disclosure of the central bank's signal, which 25 induces updating firms to utilize their private information in order to improve their estimates of the central bank's forecasting error, can potentially (that is, providing the proportion of updating firms is sufficiently large) improve welfare compared to zero transparency.
The factor ultimately responsible for the likely inferiority of full transparency is the divergence within the model between the socially optimal and the equilibrium degrees of coordination. As discussed, this divergence is reflected in private incentives to align prices that understate the social benefits of such alignment. A Pigouvian tax, as originally considered by Pavan (2007b, 2009) , provides a potential means of modifying the incentives facing firms in a manner that promotes the efficient use of information. Under the optimal tax scheme a regime of full transparency can, indeed, ensure that equilibrium outcomes coincide with socially efficient outcomes. However, unlike in Pavan (2007b, 2009 ) and James and Lawler (2012b) , appropriately-formulated stabilization policy is also an essential component in attaining optimal outcomes.
Notwithstanding the transparency implications of Pigouvian taxes, the findings that emerge from our analysis clearly cannot be viewed as providing endorsement of any general case for central bank disclosure. On the contrary, in the absence of corrective taxes, reference to empirical evidence on key model parameters suggests that, despite the theoretical ambiguities present, there should be a presumption against central banks fully revealing their information publicly. This conclusion reflects the principle, identified in Lawler (2011, 2012a) , that when private sector agents respond to information in a collectively suboptimal manner, policymakers should not disclose their private information but, instead, use it to guide their conduct of stabilization policy. Although the presence of agents who do not respond at all to current information dilutes this principle to a degree, it nonetheless retains its core validity.
